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TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN CHILDREN:
MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS V.
HOLYFIELD
Diane Allbaugh*
Introduction
In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA), creating exclusive tribal jurisdiction over custody and
placement proceedings of Indian children.' Yet the ICWA went
unaddressed by the United States Supreme Court for more than
a decade. Finally, in April 1989, the Supreme Court handed
down Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,2 pro-
viding a rigid interpretation of the ICWA's guidelines.
The ICWA statutory provisions support an argument that
notice to an Indian tribe, regarding adoption proceedings of an
Indian child, is not required when both consenting parents
request that it not be given.3 However, a more compelling
argument, which was embraced by the Court in Holyfield, is
that tribes have a statutorily-recognized right to maintain contact
with their members. The decision also reinforces the statutorily-
protected right of exclusive tribal jurisdiction in child custody
proceedings, which goes to the heart of the ICWA. 4
* Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Tax Commission, J.D., 1991, University
of Oklahoma; B.A., 1977, Cameron University.
1. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified
in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988)).
2. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
3. The ICWA states, in pertinent part:
In the case of a placement under subsection (a) or (b) of this section, if
the Indian child's tribe shall establish a different order of preference by
resolution, the agency or court effecting the placement shall follow such
order so long as the placement is the least restrictive setting appropriate
to the particular needs of the child, as provided in subsection (b) of this
section. Where appropriate, the preference of the Indian child or parent
shall be considered: Provided, That where a consenting parent evidences
a desire for anonymity, the court or agency shall give weight to such desire
in applying the preferences.
25 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
4. " [C]ongress enacted the ICWA because of concerns going beyond the wishes
of individual parents, finding that the removal of Indian children from their cultural
setting seriously impacts on long-term survival and has a damaging social and psycho-
logical impact on many individual Indian children." Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 31.
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This note will explore (1) the history of events leading up to
the enactment of the ICWA; (2) the statute itself, as a congres-
sional response to historical situations; (3) subsequent state court
decisions; (4) the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Holyfield; and (5) the possible future impact of the ICWA in
light of Holyfield.
['he courts face a delicate task when balancing the interests
of the child, tribe, and state according to the provisions of the
ICWA. Congress, through the ICWA, has given Indian tribes
virtually absolute jurisdiction over Indian child custody pro-
ceedings by enhancing the police powers of Indian tribes. Tribal
sovereignty is necessary to follow the intent of Congress to
preserve the internal welfare of Indian tribes, ensure the integrity
of Indian families, and guard the best interests of Indian chil-
dren. 5 The Supreme Court upheld the spirit and letter of the
ICWA by giving "full faith and credit" to the statute in Ho-
lyfield.
Indian tribes must be able to adjudicate disputes involving
Indians within tribal boundaries without state interference.
Moreover, tribes must have the power to decide custody issues
concerning Indian children, as this may very well be the deciding
factor in the preservation of Indian tribes.
Historical Perspective
Early United States Supreme Court rulings established the
unique status of Indian tribes as sovereign nations, although
tribes continued to rely on the federal government for protec-
tion.6 This recognition of sovereignty provided that Indian tribes
would retain all the powers of self-government, notwithstanding
those reserved to the federal government. 7
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
federal government dealt with Indian tribes in a paternalistic
mariner, effectively disregarding tribal sovereignty. However, the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 reinforced tribal sovereignty
and the right of tribal self-government.'
The courts developed three fundamental approaches to deter-
mine the authority of Indian tribes:
5. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1911 (1988).
6. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see also Cherokee Nation
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
7. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
8. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 4451-479 (1988)).
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(1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance,
all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest
renders the tribe subject to the legislative power of the
United States and in substance terminates the external
powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its powers to
enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not
by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe,
i.e., its powers of self-government. (3) These powers
are subject to qualification by treaties and by express
legislation of Congress, but save as thus expressly
qualified, tribes have full powers of internal duly con-
stituted organs of government.9
Initially, the Supreme Court prevented states from asserting
jurisdiction over Indian tribes on reservations, provided the
reservations had not been disestablished.'0 However, interaction
between Indians and non-Indians expanded with the enactment
of the General Allotment Act, which broke up the tribal land
base."
Williams v. Lee'2 established a test which allowed state en-
croachment into tribal territorial jurisdiction, provided state
action did not significantly infringe upon an Indian tribe's self-
government.' 3 This test resulted in the states maintaining juris-
diction over purely non-Indian disputes, the federal government
holding jurisdiction over actions involving Indians and non-
Indians, and Indian tribes retaining jurisdiction over purely
Indian disputes.' 4
During this time, social developments subjected Indian chil-
dren to the jurisdiction of state courts. Interracial adoptions,
fueled by a declining white birth rate, became popular between
the 1940s and 1970s. The increased demand for adoptable chil-
dren brought more Indian children through state court systems.' 5
The practice of interracial adoption was criticized for cheating
Indian children out of their cultural heritage. Moreover, agencies
involved in the interracial adoptions were criticized for not
making good-faith attempts to place minority children with
minority families.' 6
9. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (1942 ed.).
10. Kagama v. United States, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
11. white v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977).
12. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
13. Id. at 219.
14. Id. at 219-20.
15. R. SWON & G. RosEaNmH, TsANSRAciA ADOPTION (1977).
16. Id.
No. 2]
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Until 1961, states basically intervened into family affairs only
to remove children from "dissolute or depraved environments."
However, in 1961, evidence of extensive "Battered Child Syn-
drome" cases prompted states to deal with issues of child abuse
and neglect.1 7
The impact of legislation addressing child abuse and neglect
fell most heavily on "poor" Americans, primarily because the
poor receive a wide variety of state social services. Consequently,
the poor are more closely observed and are more likely to be
reported for suspected child abuse or neglect than the more
affluent members of society. Likewise, Indian families were
disproportionately affected because of the poverty factor.'8
Many states argued that Indians subjected themselves to state
law by leaving their reservations. However, the courts generally
recognized tribal interests when considering jurisdictional ques-
tions. 19
Even though courts recognized the right of the tribe's contin-
uing interest in its children and the right of Indian children to
their native culture and heritage, these disputes continued to be
decided in state courts. This resulted in a growing number of
cases in which Indian children were removed from their tribes
and families and placed in non-Indian homes because the state
courts determined that the children had been neglected or
abused.20
The Indian Child Welfare Act
The ICWA was enacted by Congress to:
[P]romote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families and the placement of such children in
foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique
values of Indian culture, and by providing for assis-
tance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and
family service programs. 2'
17. Id.; see also In re Adoption of Firecrow, 424 U.S. 382 (1976); State v. Superior
Ct., 57 Wash. 2d 181, 356 P.2d 985 (1960); In re Colwash, 57 Wash. 2d 196, 356 P.2d
994. (1960).
18. See supra note 15. See also Wisconsin Potawatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp.
719 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975).
19. In re Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906 (1976); In re Greybull, 23
Or. App. 674, 543 P.2d 1079 (1975).
20. See Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1972).
21. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988) (congressional declaration of policy).
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The ICWA was a labored product of extensive congressional
hearings held during the 93d, 94th, and 95th legislative sessions.
Indian tribes and organizations pressed the 1974 Subcommittee
on Indian Affairs to conduct oversight hearings to investigate
the wholesale removal of Indian childrenz from their families
and subsequent placement in non-Indian adoptive and foster
homes.23
At the congressional hearings, testimony from a wide variety
of public and private witnesses confirmed persistent reports of
deprivation of statutory and fundamental rights of Indian tribes,
parents, and children.2 The findings of the Senate oversight
hearings were supported by the Task Force IV of the American
Indian Policy Review Commission. Many of the commission's
recommendations were incorporated into the ICWA.2
22. Id. § 1903(4).
23. H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & ADum. NEws 7530, 7550. Listed below is a compilation of the results of the
study prepared by the Association on American Indian Affairs:
INDIAN CHILDREN IN ADOPTIVE AND FOSTER CARE
State
Alaska
Arizona
California
Idaho
Maine
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
South Dakota
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin
Wyoming
Rate of Indians
Adopted to Non-Indians
Percent
Rate of Indians in
Foster Care to Non-Indians
Percent
24. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONo. & ADNm. NEWS 7530, 7532-34.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1386, supra note 24, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
Anim. NEws at 7550.
No. 2]
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To have power, an Indian tribe must have sovereignty. The
most important aspect of sovereignty is the power "of the tribe
to determine and define its own form of government. '26 This
power includes the "right to define the powers and duties of its
officials ... and the forms and procedures which are to attest
the authoritative character of acts done in the name of the
tribe." By explicitly giving Indian tribes exclusive jurisdiction
over Indian child custody cases, the ICWA enforces tribal sov-
ereignty. Moreover, as set out in the ICWA, the legislative
purpose of protecting "the best interests of Indian children"
and the promotion of "the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families" clearly emphasizes legislative intent to protect
tribal sovereignty.2
The ICWA also established distinctive procedural and sub-
stantive safeguards to insulate Indian tribes and families from
jurisdictional intrusion by the state.29 Decisions affecting child
custody are so interwoven with ethnic and social heritage that
the choice between either tribal or state court jurisdiction may
be dispositive to the outcome of the litigation. 0
The ICWA is based upon the belief that Indian tribes are
sovereign nations and therefore, tribal courts have the right to
decide whether to remove Indian children from their families.
The ICWA provides for exclusive tribal jurisdiction over Indian
children who reside or are domiciled" on reservations, unless
26. F. CoHEN, HA"DEOOi OF FE mL INDmN LAW 126 (1st ed. reprint 1986).
27. Id.
23. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988) (congressional declaration of policy).
29. Id. at §§ 1903, 1911.
30. Tribal courts approach child custody proceedings differently than state courts.
Judge Tso, Navajo District Court Judge, clarified the difference as follows:
[Y]ou cannot separate native peoples from their culture and tradition.
This court takes judicial notice of the fact that in Navajo culture and
tradition children are not just the children of the parents but they are
children of the clan. In particular, children are consider [sic] members of
the mother's clan. While the fact could be used as a element of preference
in a child custody case, the courts [sic] wants to point out that the primary
consideration is the child's strong relationship to members of an extended
family. Because of those strong ties, children frequently live with various
members of the family without injury. This is the condition throughout
Indian Country.... Therefore, the court looks to that tradition and holds
that it must consider the children's place in the entire extended family in
order to make a judgment based upon Navajo traditional law.
Goldtooth v. Goldtooth, 3 Navajo Rptr. 223, 226 (Window Rock Dist. Ct. 1982).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988). Congress failed to define the term "domiciled" or
"resides" in the statute. The Bureau of Indian Affairs also declined to define the two
terms in the regulations because definitions already existed in state law. See Guideline
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/6
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federal law grants jurisdiction to the state.12 In addition, if an
Indian child is a ward of the tribal court, exclusive jurisdiction
remains with the tribal court regardless of the child's residence
or domicile.3
In any state court proceeding, which deals with the placement
or adoption of an Indian child not domiciled or residing on a
reservation, the tribal court has concurrent jurisdiction.3 4 The
proceeding must be transferred to a tribal court upon the request
of either parent, Indian custodian, or the child's Indian tribe.
3 5
Transfer of the court proceeding may be thwarted if: (1) the
state can show good cause; (2) either parent objects; or (3) the
tribe declines to have the proceeding transferred to the tribal
court from the state court.36
When a custody dispute remains in state court, most states
follow a two-step procedure. First, the court must determine
whether the child is dependent, neglected, or abused. Second,
the court must determine whether it is in the child's best interest
to return to the parents, place in a foster home, or to have
parental rights terminated.3 7
The ICWA established placement preferences in descending
order, which must be followed unless the tribe institutes its own
placement preference order:
for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,585 (1979).
Suggested amendments to the ICWA, which were made to the Select Committee on
Indian Affairs, proposed the following definitions:
"[D]omicile" shall be defined by the tribal law or custom of the Indian
child's tribe, or in the absence of such law or custom by Federal common
law applied in a manner which recognized that (1) many Indian people
consider their reservation to be their domicile even when absent for ex-
tended periods and (2) the intent of the Act is to defer to tribal jurisdiction
whenever possible.
"Residence" shall be defined by the tribal law or custom of the Indian
child's tribe, or in the absence of such law or custom, shall be defined as
a place of general abode or a principal, actual dwelling place of a contin-
uing or lasting nature.
S. 1976, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNe. REc. S18,534 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1987)
(suggested amendments). This definition of "domicile" would be consistent with the
Court's findings in Holyfeld, 490 U.S. at 47-49.
32. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1988).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. § 1912(a)-(13. These subsections provide for (a) notice; (b) appointment of
counsel for indigent parents or custodian; (c) examination of reports and documents;
(d) remedial services and rehabilitative programs; (e) foster care placement orders; and
(f) termination of parental rights.
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(i) a member of the Indian child's family;
(ii) a foster home licensed, approved or specified
by the Indian child's tribe;
(iii) an Indian foster home licensed or approved by
an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or
(iv) an institution for children approved by an In-
dian tribe or operated by an Indian operation which
has a program suitable to meet the Indian child's
needs.3"
The Act provides that two factors must be proven to justify
involuntary termination of parental rights:
[First, it must be shown that] active efforts have
been made to provide remedial services and rehabili-
tative programs designed to prevent the breakup of
the Indian family and that these efforts have proved
unsuccessful.
[Second,] [n]o termination of parental rights may
be ordered in such proceedings in the absence of a
determination, supported by evidence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert
witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by
the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional damage to the child.39
The ICWA also provides that a parent may withdraw consent
for termination of parental rights "for any reason at any time
prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption,
as the case may be, and the child shall be returned to the
parent." 4 Congress also mandated that the federal government,
every state, and Indian tribe must give full faith and credit to
the "public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any Indian
tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same
extent" as any other entity.41
When a custody matter involving voluntary relinquishment of
parental rights of an Indian child is in a state court, the major
issue revolves around tribal notice. Although the ICWA requires
that notice be given to a tribe when an involuntary proceeding
38. Id. § 1915(b). This section also addresses the issues of tribal preference for a
different order; personal preference; the desire for parental anonymity; social and
cultural standards; and the records of placement.
39. Id. §§ 1912(d) & (f).
40. Id. § 1913(c).
41. Id. § 1911(d).
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is in state court, 4 2 the ICWA does not specifically address vol-
untary proceedings. 43
Many courts have been concerned about other ambiguities and
gaps in the structure of the ICWA. The ICWA does not spe-
cifically address the issue of voluntary adoption proceedings of
illegitimate Indian children. State courts have disagreed on this
issue.44 However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Holyfield left
no doubt concerning the applicability of the ICWA to this type
of custody proceeding. 45
The Bureau of Indian Affairs' Guidelines to State Courts (the
Guidelines) provide needed assistance. The Guidelines state that
provisions of the ICWA should be liberally construed in order
to comply with Congress' intent to keep Indian families together,
defer to tribal judgment on matters involving the custody of
Indian children, and follow placement preference guidelines. 
4
Amendments were proposed in 1987 to the ICWA that would
clarify several confusing areas of the Act. Congress has not yet
adopted these amendments. Section 4(1)(iv) addresses the appli-
cability, of the ICWA in private placement proceedings. 47 Al-
though there have been reported instances of abuse by private
placement agencies as well as individuals, some state courts
restrict the applicability of the ICWA to state agencies only.48
State courts are confused over the controversy concerning the
existing Indian family theory. This is clarified by section 4(5)(c)
of the proposed 1987 amendments. 49 This section statutorily
imputes an existing Indian relationship between Indian children
and their tribes.50 Congress should seriously consider the pro-
posed amendments as a means to clarify and simplify confusing
and ambiguous areas of the ICWA.
42. Id. § 1912(a).
43. Id.
44. See Adoption of Baby Boy L, 231 Kan. 199, 206, 643 P.2d 168, 175 (1982);
Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985); Adoption of T.R.M., 525
N.E.2d 298, 303 (Ind. 1988).
45. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 53, 54.
46. See Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.
Reg. 67,584, 67,585 (1979).
47. S. 1976, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S18,532 (daily ed. Dec. 19,
1987) (suggested amendments).
48. See generally Baby Boy L, 643 P.2d at 174-75.
49. S. 1976, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. Rc. S18,534 (daily ed. Dec. 19,
1987) (suggested amendments).
50. Id.
No. 2]
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State Court Decisions
In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action
Although the Supreme Court did not address issues relating
the ICWA until 1989, numerous state court decisions interpreted
and applied the statute in various Indian child custody proceed-
ings. In In re Appeal in Pima County Juvenile Action,"' an
unmarried fifteen-year-old Assiniboine Indian voluntarily relin-
quished parental rights to her infant child, placing the child with
the Nevada Catholic Welfare Bureau for adoption. Six months
later, the mother filed a formal document requesting the return
of her child and revoking consent for adoption. By then, how-
ever, the child had been placed with a family in Arizona who
refused to return the child.
The adoptive family subsequently filed a petition in Arizona
to terminate Indian parental rights. The petition alleged that the
natural mother had abandoned the child. Temporary custody
was granted to the adoptive parents, and the natural mother
and her tribe were notified of the proceedings. The natural
mother requested that her tribe intervene in the Arizona custody
proceeding. A tribal judge notified the Arizona court that the
tribe wished to intervene and have the custody proceedings
transferred to the tribal court in Montana.
The Arizona court refused to transfer the proceedings and
severed the natural mother's parental rights, reasoning that: (1)
the mother had relinquished her parental rights to the child; (2)
the child had resided in Arizona with the adoptive family for
more than one year; and (3) the natural mother had not been
in contact with the child for six months, constituting abandon-
ment.52
The Arizona court also found that although the natural moth-
er's tribe had filed notice to intervene in the proceeding, it had
failed to participate in the matter.5 3 Moreover, the child was not
eligible for membership in the tribe and the "best interest"
concern required that the child remain with the adoptive par-
enf s.54 The court found that the child was domiciled in Arizona
and that "removal of the child from his preadoptive home and
his return to the mother would result in serious emotional or
51. 130 Ariz. 202, 635 P.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, Catholic Social
Servces v. P.C., 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
52. Pima County Juvenile Action, 635 P.2d at 190.
53. Id.
54. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/6
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physical damage to him, and that the petitioner for severance
had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."55
The tribal court filed a formal motion to intervene and to
transfer the proceeding to the tribal court. The tribal court
asserted that in light of the fact that the natural mother had
withdrawn her consent to adoption, the ICWA required that the
proceedings be transferred to the tribal court.56
The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed with the tribal court
and held that the order severing the natural mother's parental
rights must be vacated and the child must be returned to her.57
The appeals court set out three reasons for its findings. First,
the Arizona court lacked jurisdiction. 58 Second, even if the state
court had concurrent jurisdiction, it should not have been ex-
ercised. 59 Finally, even if the state court properly had jurisdic-
tion, the burden of proof required for termination of parental
rights had not been met.60
The appeals court found that the tribal court retained exclusive
jurisdiction although the child had been removed from the state
for the purpose of adoption. The court stated that "[tihe dom-
icile of an infant born out of wedlock remains that of its mother
until a new one is lawfully acquired. '61
The appeals court declared that the ICWA provision allowing
for concurrent jurisdiction did not apply in this case. 62 The
Arizona court refused to transfer jurisdiction because it found
"good cause" for retention. However, the appeals court stated
that although the term "good cause" is not defined in the
ICWA, a definition is contained in the federal regulations which
includes, but is not limited to the following circumstances:
(1) the child's biological parents are unavailable; (2)
no Indian custodian has been appointed; (3) the child
has had little contact with the tribe for a significant
period of time; (4) the child has not resided on the
reservation for a significant period of time; and (5)
the child, over 12 years of age, has indicated opposi-
tion to the transfer. 63
55. Id.
56. Id. at 190-91.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 191.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 192.
63. Id. at 191.
No. 2]
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The appeals court found that the natural mother's request for
the return of her child was authorized by the statute, which
allows a parent to withdraw consent for termination of parental
rights at any time prior to final adjudication. Upon withdrawal
of consent, the child must be returned to the parent. 6
The appeals court reasoned that Congress was not concerned
with the motive for the withdrawal of parental consent. The
ICWA "provides a higher standard of protection to the rights
of parents in termination proceedings. '" 65 The appeals court also
found that jurisdiction should have been- deferred to the tribal
court due to evidence of the natural mother's parental fitness
and because "qualified" expert witnesses would be more readily
accessible in Montana.6
.Finally, the appeals court addressed the issue of the burden
of proof required for termination of parental rights. The appeals
court relied on the following statutory provisions:
Section 1912(f) provides:
No termination of parental rights may be
ordered in such proceeding in the absence
of a determination, supported by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, including testi-
mony of qualified expert witnesses that the
continued custody of the child by the parent
or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the
child.
Section 1912(d) provides:
Any party seeking to effect a foster care
placement of, or termination of parental
rights to, an Indian child under State law
shall satisfy the court that active efforts have
been made to provide remedial services and
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent
the breakup of the Indian family and that
these efforts have proved unsuccessful. 67
64. Id. at 192 (quoting 25 U.S.C.A. § 1913(c)).
65. Id. (citing E.A. v. State, 623 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1981)).
66. Id.
,57. Id. at 192-93 (quoting 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1912(f) & (d)).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/6
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The court held that these provisions were controlling." More-
over, because the child was only seven months old at the time,
the mother was entitled to have the child returned. Any potential
harm to the child resulted from the conduct of the adoptive
parents rather than adherence to the statutory provisions. 69 The
"evil which Congress sought to remedy by the Act was exac-
erbated by the conduct here under the guise of 'the best interests
of the child." 70
This case represents precisely the horror that Congress sought
to prevent by enacting the ICWA. First, as supported by public
policy, the integrity of the Indian family should be preserved.
Remedial and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the
breakup of Indian families must prove unsuccessful before an
Indian child is removed from the home. The Arizona court
failed to address this requirement.
Moreover, it must be determined "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that the Indian child would likely sustain serious emotional
damage if the parent or Indian custodian continue to have
custody. The Arizona court not only failed to apply both prongs
of this test, but refused to acknowledge the ICWA as controlling.
This was evidenced by the court's refusal to return the child to
the natural mother upon her revocation of consent to terminate
her parental rights, as required by the ICWA.
The Arizona appeals court correctly found that the state court
lacked jurisdiction in this case. Following the letter and spirit
of the ICWA, the Assiniboine Tribe had exclusive jurisdiction
over this custody matter. A tribe's protected interest should not
be defeated by actions designed to evade the provisions of the
ICWA.
In re J.R.S.
In September 1984 the Supreme Court of Alaska decided In
re J.R.S.71 By the time he was nine years old, J.R.S., a member
of the tribe of the Village of Chalkyitsik, 2 had lived with his
mother, various maternal family members, and in foster homes.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 193.
70. Id.
71. 690 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1984).
72. Because it is a recognized "Native village" under 43 U.S.C. § 1602(c) (section
3(c) of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act), Chalkyitsik is an "Indian tribe" for
the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(8) (1988). It is J.R.S.'s
"tribe" because his natural mother is from Chalkyitsik and he has become a member
of the Village. J.R.S., 690 P.2d at 12 n.1 (citation omitted).
No. 2]
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During this time, J.R.S.'s mother signed a petition to relinquish
heir parental rights and the natural father did not contest the
petition.7 3
In December 1982, J.R.S. was adopted by the appellees,
M.S.F. and J.J.G. Two months before his adoption, the Village
of Chalkyitsik formally intervened to prevent the "Child in
Need of Aid" proceeding. When the request was denied, the
Village filed a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding
which was also denied.7 4
On the day of the scheduled adoption hearing, the Village
filed a document signed by J.R.S.'s mother, M.C.H., which
revoked her relinquishment of parental rights. The superior court
refused to acknowledge the revocation and granted the appellees'
adoption petition. The Village appealed to the Alaska Supreme
Court on the grounds that it should have been allowed to
intervene and that the natural mother's revocation should have
been held valid. 75
The state argued that the termination proceeding was invol-
untary, and therefore section 1912, which does not allow for
parental revocation, would control. However, the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that section 1913 of the ICWA,7 6 which applies
to voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, controlled in this
case. The state supreme court found that relinquishment papers,
which the state prepared for the mother's signature, referred to
state statutes dealing with voluntary relinquishment. Moreover,
both counsel for the natural mother and the court explained the
papers to her and found that the mother acted voluntarily and
with a clear understanding of the situationYn
The state supreme court also noted that section 1912(f) of the
ICWA requires that "evidence beyond a reasonable doubt" of
likely "serious emotional or physical damage to the child" must
be found before involuntary termination of parental rights may
proceed. 78 Because the superior court failed to make this deter-
73. J.R.S., 690 P.2d at 12 n.l.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. "In any voluntary proceeding for termination of parental rights to, or adoptive
placement of, an Indian child, the consent of the parent may be withdrawn for any
reason at any time prior to the entry of a final decree of termination or adoption, as
the case may be, and the child shall be returned to the parent." 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c)
(1988).
77. J.R.S., 690 P.2d at 13.
78. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/6
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mination, any order issued under this section of the statute
would be invalid. 9
The court also found that section 1913(c) does not give a
parent the right to rescind voluntary relinquishment of parental
rights once a final termination order has been entered. 0 Even
though the state supreme court affirmed the superior court's
final adoption order, it held that the decision to set aside the
ICWA's placement preference system and deny the Village's
right to intervene in the proceedings was fatal to that order."'
The state supreme court determined that the Village's interest
in J.R.S.'s adoption proceeding was protected by rule 24(a) of
the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.Y2 Consequently, this pro-
tected interest required that the tribe be allowed to intervene in
the custody proceeding.83
It is well settled that Congress may preempt state jurisdiction
over Indian child custody and domestic relations matters. 84 This
is precisely what Congress sought to control by enacting the
ICWA. The superior court erred by refusing to allow the Village
to intervene in J.R.S.'s adoption proceeding. Moreover, the
superior court failed to follow the mandated placement prefer-
ence provisions of the ICWA. The Alaska Supreme Court cor-
rectly found that these state actions were fatal to the superior
court's decision in J.R.S..
In his dissent, Justice Compton argued that the only interest
the tribe had in the proceeding was a "general oversight" in-
terest. Therefore, the tribe's interest was not specifically pro-
tected by the ICWA.85 The dissent noted:
[N]o statutory right is being denied any person or the
Village of Chalkyitsik. No member of J.R.S.'s ex-
tended family is seeking to adopt him. No member of
J.R.S.'s Indian tribe is seeking to adopt him. The
Village of Chalkyitsik has not by resolution altered
the statutory preference, and hence the state court is
79. Id.
80. Id. at 13-14.
81. Id. at 15-19.
82. Id. at 17-18. "Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action
may impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties." ALAs A R. Cirv. P. 24(a).
83. .R.S., 690 P.2d at 18-19.
84. Iron Bear v. District Court, 512 P.2d 1292 (Mont. 1973).
85. J.R.S., 690 P.2d at 19.
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not refusing to honor any statutory right given an
Indian tribe.... The tribe may have an interest in
seeing that a child is not adopted by a non-tribal family
but this interest has not been recognized by the ICWA 5
Justice Compton argued that because the ICWA's placement
preference scheme was not an issue in this appeal it should not
have been addressed by the court.87
The protected interest of tribal continuity and self-government
lies at the very heart of the ICWA. In certain instances such as
this, the interests of the tribe outweigh the interests of the state.
If Indian heritage is to be preserved, the tribes must have the
ability to ensure this continuity for future generations.
In re Adoption of Halloway
'In In re Adoption of Halloway,5 a full-blooded Navajo Indian
woman allowed her sister to remove her year-old son, Jeremiah,
from the Navajo reservation in New Mexico and temporarily
place him in a foster home. Jeremiah had lived with his mother
on the reservation until he was six months of age. He then lived
with his grandmother on the reservation until he was removed
by his aunt.8 9
Two months after Jeremiah's removal from the reservation,
his mother learned of his pending adoption by a non-Indian
couple. Jeremiah's mother signed a consent to the adoption and
the adoptive parents immediately filed a petition with the Utah
State Court for adoption. The trial court ordered the adoptive
parents' counsel to notify Jeremiah's tribe and to obtain its
consent before continuing with the adoption proceeding. The
tribe was notified five months after the initial adoption hearing.
Two years later, the tribe intervened and moved to dismiss the
proceeding, arguing that the state court lacked jurisdiction be-
cause Jeremiah was an Indian child and was domiciled on the
Navajo reservation.9°
The trial court determined that Jeremiah was domiciled in
Utah and denied the tribe's motion to dismiss. The trial court
86. Id. at 20.
87. Id.
88. 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986).
89. Id. at 963.
90. Id. "An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as to any State over any
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who resides or is domiciled within
the reservation of such tribe, except where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the
State by existing Federal law." 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol16/iss2/6
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reasoned that Jeremiah's residence had been voluntarily trans-
ferred from the natural mother, grandmother, and reservation
to the adoptive parents. 91 The trial court stated that it had
"good cause" 92 for retaining jurisdiction based on the fact that
Jeremiah's domicile had changed and in light of the extended
period of time that Jeremiah had lived with his adoptive par-
ents. 93
After several additional hearings, the trial court reaffirmed
its decision. The trial court also acknowledged that Jeremiah's
mother had withdrawn her consent to the adoption prior to its
91. Halloway, 732 P.2d at 963.
92. Id. at 963-64 n.2.
In any State proceeding for the ... termination of parental rights to an
Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian
child's tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall
transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection
by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian
or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject
to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988) (emphasis added). "Good cause" is defined in the Guidelines
for State Courts: Indian Custody Proceedings. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (1979) (suggested
amendments). These guidelines represent the interpretation of various ICWA provisions
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior. Under the guidelines,
"good cause" is defined as follows:
(a) Good cause not to transfer the proceeding exists if the Indian child's
tribe does not have a tribal court as defined by the Act to which the case
can be transferred.
(b) Good cause not to transfer the proceeding may exist if any of the
following circumstances exist:
(i) The proceeding was at an advanced stage when the
petition to transfer was received and the petitioner did not
file the petition properly after receiving notice of the hearing.
(ii) The Indian child is over twelve years of age and objects
to the transfer.
(iii) The evidence necessary to decide the case could not be
adequately presented in-the tribal court without undue hard-
ship to the parties or the witnesses.
(iv) The parents of a child over five years of age are not
available and the child has had little or no contact with the
child's tribe or members of the child's tribe.
(c) Socio-economic conditions and the perceived adequacy of tribal or
Bureau of Indian Affairs social services or judicial systems may not be
considered in a determination that good cause exists.
(d) The burden of establishing good cause to the contrary shall be on the
party opposing the transfer.
Id. at 67,591.
93. Halloway, 732 P.2d at 963.
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decision. A hearing was finally scheduled one year later on the
petition for termination of parental rights. 94
Ten days before the hearing date, the tribal court handed
down a decision which held that Jeremiah was a domiciliary of
the Navajo nation and that the tribal court had exclusive juris-
diction to determine his custody. The tribal court filed a motion
with the state court requesting that full faith and credit be given
to its decision and that the state proceedings be dismissed. The
tribe's motion was denied on the grounds that it was untimely.
Subsequently, the Utah Supreme Court decided to hear the case
to determine whether the trial court properly retained jurisdiction
of the proceeding. 95
The Utah Supreme Court looked to federal law for guidance
because of the very limited circumstances under which the ICWA
grants state courts jurisdiction in Indian child custody proceed-
ings. The state supreme court focused on subsections (a) and
(b) of the ICWA section 1911 as "pivotal provisions" in this
decision.9 6 Under these provisions, Indian tribes are granted
exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings involving an Indian child
"who resides or is domiciled within the reservation" of his
tribe.97 Moreover, even if an Indian child is not domiciled or
residing on a reservation, the state courts, absent good cause,
must transfer the custody proceeding to the child's tribal court
if the tribe requests a transfer. 98
The Utah Supreme Court found that:
These provisions are at the heart of the ICWA. The
ICWA was passed in 1978 in response to congressional
findings that
an alarmingly high percentage of Indian
families are broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by
nontribal public and private agencies and
that an alarmingly high percentage of such
94. Id. at 964.
[E]very State... shall give full faith and credit to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child
custody proceedings to the same extent that such entities give full faith
and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of any
other entity.
25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1988).
95. Halloway, 732 P.2d at 964-65.
96. Id. at 965.
97. Id.
98. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)-(b) (1988).
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children are placed in non-Indian foster and
adoptive homes and institutions; and
S.. the States, exercising their recognized
jurisdiction over Indian child custody pro-
ceedings through administrative and judicial
bodies, have often failed to recognize the
essential tribal relations of Indian people and
the cultural and social standards prevailing
in Indian communities and families. 99
The state supreme court found that the primary issue was
Jeremiah's domicile at the time of the custody dispute. The
court found that the federal statutes which address jurisdictional
issues were controlling. 100
Although the ICWA does not define "domicile," the court
noted that the "law of domicile" was well established. An
illegitimate child acquires the domicile of his mother at birth.
Even if the child lives apart from his mother, his domicile
remains with the mother unless he is abandoned or his domicile
is lawfully changed. However, if the child is abandoned by his
parents, he acquires the domicile of the people he lives with at
that time. 1 1 Under these provisions, the state supreme court
held that Jeremiah was domiciled on the Navajo reservation and
that the tribe had exclusive jurisdiction until the time that he
,was removed from the reservation by his aunt.102
The next issue the state supreme court addressed was whether
Jeremiah's removal from the reservation changed his domicile.
The court affirmed the trial court's determination that Jeremiah
had been abandoned by his mother. The court supported this
view because when Jeremiah's mother learned of the contem-
plated adoption, she permitted him to remain with the adoptive
parents.103
The state supreme court held:
There certainly is nothing in the ICWA or its legislative
history to suggest that state law controls if, in appli-
cation, its subtleties bring it into conflict with the
ICWA in ways that Congress apparently did not fore-
99. Halloway, 732 P.2d at 965 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4)-(5) (1982)).
100. Id. at 966.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 967.
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see. Under general supremacy principles, state law
cannot be permitted to operate "as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress." If it does, state law is
preempted. And even if Congress did not intend to
preempt state domicile law, state law must bow when
the application of that law brings the state and federal
policies into conflict. 104
Utah's laws of abandonment and domicile deprived Jeremiah's
tribe of exclusive jurisdiction contrary to section 1911 of the
ICWA, which grants exclusive jurisdiction to the tribe. However,
the court found that Congress intended that Indian tribes should
have the authority to determine custody disputes involving In-
dian children. 105
The Utah Supreme Court criticized Jeremiah's mother, aunt,
and adoptive parents for removing him from the reservation and
his -tribe. The court found that this action was taken with the
intent of having the state court place Jeremiah with a non-
Indian family. "[Tihis receptivity of the non-Indian forum to
non..Indian placement of an Indian child is precisely one of the
evils at which the ICWA was aimed."'16
The court also criticized Jeremiah's mother for subverting
another provision of the ICWA by not executing in writing, and
recording "before a judge of competent jurisdiction," her vol-
untary termination of parental rights petition.' °7 By taking ad-
vantage of Utah's law, which permits a child's domicile to
change in the event of abandonment, Jeremiah's mother by-
passed the tribal court to facilitate Jeremiah's adoption by non-
Indians. 08
Jeremiah was held to be a domiciliary of the Navajo reser-
vation, over whom the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction.1°
The state supreme court was sensitive to the fact that during
the process of litigating these issues, Jeremiah had lived with
his adoptive parents for six years. However, the court stated:
"While stability in child placement should be a paramount value,
... it cannot be the sole yardstick by which the legality of a
particular custodial arrangement is judged. Such a standard
104. Id. (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 968; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)-(b) (1988).
106. Halloway, 732 P.2d at 969.
107. Id.
1011. Id. at 969-70.
109. Id. at 972.
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would reward those who obtain custody, whether lawfully or
otherwise, and maintain it during any ensuing (and protracted)
litigation."110 The court left the final determination of Jere-
miah's custody to the tribal court's "experience, wisdom, and
compassion."'"
Justice Howe argued in his dissent that Jeremiah's mother's
acts of abandonment deprived the tribal court of jurisdiction of
the custody dispute." 2 However, Justice Howe noted that Amer-
ica is a nation of people on the move and Indian people are no
less mobile."' Many Indians leave their reservations in search
of work or a different lifestyle, only returning to visit relatives.
Their domicile should be considered on an individual basis.
"The purpose of the ICWA, much like our state laws on taxation
and elections, will not be defeated because of the mobility of
our nation.""14
The Utah Supreme Court followed the intent of the ICWA
in holding that the actions of Jeremiah's mother, aunt, and
adoptive family were designed to defeat tribal jurisdiction and
were therefore void. Jeremiah was properly domiciled on the
reservation, and therefore, the Navajo tribe had exclusive juris-
diction over his custody proceedings.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield
The previously discussed state court decisions, and many more
like them, paved the way for the United States Supreme Court's
first decision concerning the ICWA in Mississippi Band of Choc-
taw Indians v. Holyfield."5 The Court granted plenary review
based on "the centrality of the exclusive tribal jurisdiction pro-
vision to the overall scheme of the ICWA, as well as the conflict
between" state court decisions." 6
In Holyfield, the unmarried parents of twin infants were
enrolled members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
Tribe and resided on the reservation.17 The parents drove ap-
proximately two hundred miles off the reservation to give birth
to the twin infants in December 1985. They immediately placed
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (Howe, J., dissenting)
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
116. Id. at 41.
117. Id. at 37.
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the infants for adoption with a non-Indian couple, the Holy-
fields, and signed consent-to-adoption forms. After the adoptive
parents filed a petition for adoption, the trial court quickly
issued the final adoption decree on January 28, 1986.118
Two months later, the tribe filed a motion to vacate the
adoption based on exclusive tribal court jurisdiction as set out
in the ICWA. The trial court denied the motion, holding that
because the natural parents went to such great efforts to make
sure the children were born off the reservation, and because the
children had neither resided on, nor had physically been on the
reservation, the children were not domiciles of the reservation.
Therefore, the state court properly had jurisdiction.11 9
The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's
ruling and recognized the pivotal issue to be whether the infants
were actually domicilaries of the reservation. The court rejected
the tribe's position that the children were domiciled on the
reservation by virtue of living within their mother's womb. 2 0
The state court discussed the fact that the ICWA's jurisdic-
tional provisions had a solid foundation in pre-ICWA federal
and. state case law.1 21 Consequently, child custody proceedings
which involve Indian children domiciled on the reservation fall
under exclusive tribal jurisdiction. '1
In Holyfield, it was not disputed that the twins were "Indian
children."' 3 The issue was whether the twins were "domiciled"
on the Choctaw reservation. 24 In light of this issue, the Court
also addressed the issue of whether Congress intended state law
118. Id. at 37-38.
119. Id. at 38-39.
120. Id. at 39 (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 42.
122. Id.
123. Id; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988).
124. Holyfeld, 490 U.S. at 42 & n.16.
'Reservation' is defined quite broadly for purposes of the ICWA. See
25 U.S.C. § 1903(10) (1988). There is no dispute that the Choctaw Res-
ervation falls within that definition.
Section 1911(a) does not apply "where such jurisdiction is otherwise
vested in the State by existing Federal law." This proviso would appear
to refer to Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588, as amended, which allows States
under certain conditions to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction on the
reservation. ICWA section 1918 permits a tribe in that situation to reassume
jurisdiction over child custody proceedings upon petition to the Secretary
of the Interior. The State of Mississippi has never asserted jurisdiction
over the Choctaw Reservation under Public Law 280.
Id. (citations omitted).
554.
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to define "domicile."'2 The Court found that federal statues
are intended to give rise to "uniform nationwide application. ' 126
Therefore, when Congress enacts a statute, it does not make the
application of the statute dependent on state law. 127
The Court stated:
First, and most fundamentally, the purpose of the
ICWA gives no reason to believe that Congress in-
tended to rely on state law for the definition of a
critical term; quite the contrary. It is clear from the
very text of the ICWA, not to mention its legislative
history and the hearings that led to its enactment, that
Congress was concerned with the rights of Indian
families and Indian communities vis-d-vis state au-
thorities. More specifically, its purpose was, in part,
to make clear that in certain situations the state courts
did not have jurisdiction over child custody proceed-
ings. Indeed, the congressional findings that are a part
of the statute demonstrate that Congress perceived the
States and their courts as partly responsible for the
problem it intended to correct ....
Second, Congress could hardly have intended the
lack of nationwide uniformity that would result from
state-law definitions of domicile.... Even if we could
conceive of a federal statute under which the rules of
domicile (and thus of jurisdiction) applied differently
to different Indian children, a statute under which
different rules apply from time to time to the same
child, simply as a result of her transport from one
State to another, cannot be what Congress had in
mind.'2
The Court found that in following the well-settled principles
of "domicile," 1 29 it would be "entirely logical that '[o]n occa-
125. Holyfeld, 490 U.S. at 43.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 44-46.
129. Id. at 47-48.
"Domicile" is, of course, a concept widely used in both federal and
state courts for jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws purposes, and its meaning
is generally uncontroverted. "Domicile" is not necessarily synonymous
with "residence," and one can reside in one place but be domiciled in
another. For adults, domicile is established by physical presence in a place
in connection with a certain state of mind concerning one's intent to
No. 2]
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sion, a child's domicile of origin will be in a place where the
child has never been.""' 3 0 The natural parents' domicile had
always been, and continued to be, the reservation of the Choctaw
Tribe. Therefore, even though the infants had never actually
been on the reservation, they were domiciled there.' In response
to the argument that the twins were voluntarily placed for
adoption, the Court stated that tribal jurisdiction, under section
1911(a) of the ICWA, was not meant to be circumvented by
individual tribal members. Congressional concern extended be-
yond that of the Indian children and families to include the
impact on the tribes themselves in light of the placement of
large numbers of Indian children in non-Indians homes.13 2
The Court cited the Utah Supreme Court's decision in In re
Adoption of Halloway,3 3 and agreed that "the law of domicile
Congress used in the ICWA cannot be one that permits individ-
ual reservation-domiciled tribal members to defeat the tribe's
exclusive jurisdiction by the simple expedience of giving birth
and placing the child for adoption off the reservation."' 3 4 There-
fore, the Choctaw tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over
the twins' adoption proceeding and the state court's decree
granting the adoption was vacated' 35
Like the court in Halloway, the Court took notice of the fact
that the twins had lived with the adoptive parents for three
years and that separating them would cause considerable pain.'36
The Court, in citing Halloway, deferred to the "experience,
wisdom, and compassion of the [Choctaw] tribal courts to fash-
ion an appropriate remedy.' 3 7
Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist
dissented, with Justice Stevens agreeing with the majority that
remain there. One acquires a "domicile of origin" at birth, and that
domicile continues until a new one (a "domicile of choice") is acquired.
Since most minors are legally incapable of forming the requisite intent to
establish a domicile, their domicile is determined by that of their parents.
In the case of an illegitimate child, that has traditionally meant the domicile
of its mother.
Id. at 48 (citations omitted).
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 48-49.
132. Id. at 49.
133. 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986).
134. Holyfeld, 490 U.S. at 53.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 54.
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Congress intended to fashion a "uniform federal law of domicile
for the [ICWA]." '13 However, Justice Stevens did not agree with
the majority's limited definition of domicile. He argued that the
natural parents should have had the right to invoke the state
court's adoption procedures, and that the Court's definition of
domicile "distorts the delicate balance between individual rights
and group rights recognized by the ICWA. ' 139
Justice Stevens argued that the ICWA was primarily instituted
to prevent the unwarranted removal of Indian children from
their families and tribes. The statute was not designed to restrict
the rights of parents of Indian children.140
However, if knowledge of tribal traditions is to survive, then
in some circumstances the interests of the tribe must outweigh
the interests of the individual. The tribal courts, not state courts,
are in the best position to weigh the conflicting interests of all
concerned and Congress has recognized this by enacting the
ICWA.
Conclusion
Indian tribes should play a primary role in adjudicating cus-
tody issues concerning Indian children. Indian children are the
tribe's future, and therefore, tribes have a vested interest in
ensuring the continuity and integrity of their membership.
In Holyfield, the Court tackled the difficult task of balancing
the interests of the tribe, the child and the state. The ICWA is
based on the essential belief that Indian children and the con-
tinuity of their tribes must be protected against unauthorized
state intrusion. However, in applying the provisions of the
ICWA, inherent ambiguities and omissions have led to disparate
state court decisions. Congress should seriously consider imple-
menting the proposed 1987 amendments to the ICWA in order
to clarify its provisions.
Undoubtedly, the ICWA was designed to protect the best
interests of Indian children, their parents, and their tribes. Public
policy demands that we provide for and protect our children.
Public policy also demands that we preserve the "family" unit
if at all possible to ensure a stable and productive society. The
ICWA strives to accomplish these two paramount tasks while
enforcing tribal sovereignty and self-government.
138. Id. at 55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 57.
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The Court's decision in Holyfield dictates that the ICWA be
read broadly to grant jurisdiction to tribal courts in Indian child
custody matters. This decision supports the congressional intent
that neither the individual nor the state should be allowed to
defeat the purpose of the ICWA.
Addendum
Mr. Holyfield died while this case was pending before the
Supreme Court. Upon remand from the United States Supreme
Court, the Tribal Court of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians issued its final determination in this case. First, the
court determined that the alleged putative father was not the
natural father of the twins. Second, the court terminated the
parental rights of the natural mother and granted the adoption
petition of Vivian Joan Holyfield.141
14.1. Holyfield v. Choctaw Social Services/ Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,
The Natural Mother and Alleged Natural Father, No. AD 017-90 (Mississippi Band of
Chociaw Indians Tribal Ct.) (July 27, 1990) (recorded in "Adoption Book 1, pages 89-
90").
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